PHL342 · Minds & Machines

Lecture · 11 (b)

2017 · Nov · 23



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Lecture · 11 (b)

2017 · Nov · 23

fast forward 250 years ...

to mind

fast forward 250 years ...

William James (1842–1910)

1. Father of psychology

- 1. Brother: Henry James (1843–1916)
- 2. Friend: Charles Saunders Pierce (1839-1914)
- 3. Cf. Louis Menand's The Metaphysical Club: A Story of Ideas in America



The

Club

LOUIS MENAND

mentality.' "Introspective observation is what we have to rely on first and foremost and always. Every one agrees that we there discover states of consciousness." — Principles of Psychology, (1890) 3. Ended up thinking it should be **banished from** scientific study "Consciousness is the name of a non-entity. and has no right place among first principles." Slide 5 / 22 (IV · Open Issues) Consciousness · I

"Consciousness is the starting place of all psychology, the most crucial aspect of human



Slide 6 / 22

Lecture · 11 (b)

2017 · Nov · 23

PHL342 · Minds & Machines

Lecture · 11 (b)

Sigmund Freud (1856–1939)

(IV · Open Issues) Consciousness · I

- 1. One of the most important contributors to our contemporary understanding of consciousness ... through his (supposed) "discovery of the unconsciousness"
- 2. Striking contrast with Descartesmuch that is true of us we are not *aware of* (something we now assume)
- 3. Developed over many years in (among other places) *psycho-analytic theory*



Why has cognitive science been so developed through an analysis of logic, rationality, etc.—instead of through an understanding of the psyche, including as delineated in psycho-analytic theory?

2017 · Nov · 23 20th and 21st century

1. Early 20th c.: With rise of behaviourism and positivism (in part for political reasons!), consciousness banned from "proper" scientific discourse

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- Viewed as subjective, epiphenomenal, unmeasurable, wholly inappropriate
- 2. Continued (with notable exceptions) up through the 1970s
- 3. Suddenly, in the 1980s, consciousness went from taboo to trendy
 - Dennett: Content and Consciousness (1969) \Leftarrow one of the exceptions
 - Dennett: Consciousness Explained (1992) —
 - Searle: The Mystery of Consciousness (1990)
 - Edelman: Remembered Present: a Biological Theory of Consciousness (1990)

 \leftarrow you can go!

- 4. Launch of the Journal of Consciousness Studies (1994)
- 5. Conference series: "Towards a Science of Consciousness"
 - 2014: April 21-26, Tucson, AZ
 - 2015: June 9-13, Helsinki, Finland
 - 2016: April 25-30, Tucson AZ
 - 2017: June 6-10, Shanghai, China
 - 2018: April 2-7, Tucson AZ
- 6. Now a huge literature on consciousness in philosophy, neuroscience, ...

Lecture · 11 (b)



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Polysemy — what does the te	rm 'consciousness' refer to?		Polysemy — should we give them all distinct n	ames?
 A global property that have—and that rocks & 			 A global property that people (always) have—and that rocks & plants don't 	Conscious (
A local property that y awake (and perhaps w			A local property that you have while awake (and perhaps while sleeping?)	← Conscious ₂
 A property of beliefs, p (e.g., "a conscious bel Llewellyn is out to get 	iefthat		 A property of beliefs, pains, etc (e.g., "a conscious belief that Llewellyn is out to get him") 	← conscious ₂ ← conscious ₃ Isn ² there something in common ²
4. Self-consciousness	← how is it rela	ited to the others?	4. Self-consciousness	$\leftarrow C_{4330}^{4330}$ us ₄
5. "Pure" consciousness	⇐ e.g., via mea	litation (chemicals?)	5. "Pure" consciousness	$\Leftarrow consciences$
6. Awareness or attention	\leftarrow conscious of	car outside house?	6. Awareness or attention	\leftarrow conscious 6
7. Distinctive properties	of the brain		7. Distinctive properties of the brain	🚝 Conscious
8 etc.			8 etc	Conscious
2017 · Nov · 23	PHL342 • Minds & Machines	Lecture · 11 (b)	2017 · Nov · 23 PHL342 · Minds & M	lachines Lecture • 11 (b)
lssues			Wide (if not wild) disagreement on whethe	er it is amenable to scientific study
1. General questions			1. Some think yes	
a) What is it (that "thing inb) Is it amenable to scientific study?	common")? ← <i>in particular, and what</i> kina		a) Answer in neuroscienceb) Answer in cognitive psychology	\Leftarrow huge variety of different views
c) Does it supervene on physical materiality?	\Leftarrow can it be made out of straig	htforward physical stuff"?	c) Answer in quantum mechanicsd) Answer will require reformulating science	
2. Widespread agreement			 Even: reformulating what science is 	
 a) Everyone knows 1st-person (i.e., what it is like <u>subject</u>) b) No agreement 3rd-person (i.e., on what it is like <u>obj</u> 	ively) (cf. Louis Armstrong: "if yo ask, you ain't never gonn	u gotta	 E.g., "pan-phenomenalism" 2. Some think no a) Intrinsically unscientific b) Not <i>intrinsically</i> unscientific, but we humans will never understand itwe're not smart enough! c) Someday, but not soon 	⇐ again, wide variety of views ⇐ so-called " <u>new mysterians</u> "

As and the entry entry on the physics

View A - Subjectivity and Indexicality

1. First person

- a) Private
- b) Authoritative
- c) Privileged access
- d) Not based on evidence, perception, or sensation

2. NB: Doesn't require (Cartesian) transparency

- 3. Perspectival
 - a) From a "point of view"
 - b) Look out "from inside you"
- 4. The "essential indexical"
 - a) Perry's "bag of sugar" story (from Tuesday)
 - b) Indexicality in general: me, you, today, here, there, yesterday, etc....

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Four contrasting views

D. Qualia

A. Subjectivity & indexicality

B. Inner awareness

(introspection)

C. Coherence and control

Slide 13 / 22

(IV · Open Issues) Consciousness · I

Slide 14 / 22

2017 · Nov · 23

PHL342 · Minds & Machines

Lecture · 11 (b)

2017 · Nov · 23

PHL342 · Minds & Machines

Lecture · 11 (b)



"Of course that was long ago, but at the time it seemed like the present."



"Are we in this Starbucks or the one down the street?"

I ne subject matter of my PNL dissertation (on "reflection")

View B - Inner Awareness & Introspection

- 1. Something clearly right about this idea—or at least very common The subject matter of my phD
- 2. "Truck-driver" phenomenon...
 - a) Aware of the world
 - b) Not aware of being aware of the world
- 3. Suggests the importance of meta-level beliefs
 - a) Requires meta-level concepts (of 'belief,' 'pain,' etc.)
 - b) Not otherwise perplexing?
- 4. In my view, a better story about self-consciousness than about consciousness per se
- 5. NB: Meta-level cognition cannot be the story of what secures the ineliminable first-person character of consciousness (cf. View A)

b) Less clear (there is disagreement) over states of *belief*

- a) One's meta-level beliefs must still recognize object-level beliefs as one's own
- b) Cf. Zahavi's Self-Awareness & Alterity (1999)

View C – Coherence & Control

- 1. Dubbed access consciousness by Ned Block
 - a) Available for epistemic self-reporting
 - b) Able to control behaviour
- 2. Unification of sensory information
 - a) Multi-modal integration
 - b) 40Hz brain waves (and subsequent versions)
- 3. Seems the most likely thing to be explained at the neuroscientific level
- 4. Status
 - a) Unarguable that this kind of functionality exists—and is crucial
 - b) Yet to many (including me!), it does not seem (enough) to explain (what are viewed as) those properties of consciousness that are most distinctive, that involve first-person subjectivity, and that warrant its being considered at least in some ways mysterious.

(IV · Open Issues) Conscious	sness · I	Slide 17 / 22	(IV · Open Issues) Consciou	sness • I	Slide 18 / 22
2017 • Nov • 23	PHL342 · Minds & Machines	Lecture • 11 (b)	2017 · Nov · 23	PHL342 · Minds & Machines	Lecture · 11 (b)
View D — Qualia			The "Hard Proble	em"	
conscious r	it is like to be " (sensory?) character of nental states, as characterized by Thomas What Is It Like to Be a Bat?")		the " hard pro		
of consciou	his is where the "mystery" isness resides	x		ns of zombies	
,	e raw feel dness of red" itmeg-y taste of nutmeg" with (is2) the aualitative or	of	b) Huge de	pates on whether the notion has any intellectual me at deal of literature has been written exploring the	
4. Has to do v	with (is?) the <i>qualitative</i> or blogical character of experience		a) Inverted b) <i>Logical</i> vs	spectrum . <i>nomological</i> vs. <i>metaphysical</i> vs. <i>empirical</i> (im)possibil	lity
5. Leads to "w	vhat it is like" to be in a mental state		4. Cf. tooth pair	n example (Güzeldere)	
a) Seems	immediately applicable to sensory and emotional s	tates			

(IV · Open Issues) Consciousness · I

From Qualia to the Explanatory Gap

- 1. "Explanatory Gap" formulation by Joe Levine
- 2. How do we deal with the (seemingly) vast, dreaded gap between
 - a) **Subjective:** the *involved*, inexorably *first-person phenomenological* or *qualitative* character of *conscious experience*, and
 - b) Objective: the *detached*, *third-person* character of empirical science from physics and neuroscience to cognitive science to scientific psychology?

No problem, say I!

3. Can these two views be unified?

 The best formulation of the challenge facing cognitive science (imho) Next Tuesday I will talk about how I think qualia arise, and about how the explanatory gap can be crossed

(IV · Open Issues) Consciousness · I

Slide 21/22

(IV · Open Issues) Consciousness · I

Slide 22 / 22







2019 · April · 17

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Lecture — $D \cdot 02$

For example—and importantly—I do not believe that the *natural environment* can be accounted for in terms of any such discrete ontology...



(IV · Open Issues) Consciousness · 2

Slide 5 / 38



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(IV · Open Issues) Consciousness · 2

2019 · April · 17

Slide 6 / 38

Lecture – D · 02



(IV · Open Issues) Consciousness · 2



(IV · Open Issues) Consciousness · 2





2019 · April · 17 Minds & Machines Lecture – D · 02 Three major intellectual challenges for Cognitive Science #1 - Naturalizing Semantics and Intentionality Well recognized 1. The question is how cognitive science would be different if we a) Didn't start assuming that the world consisted of discrete objects, properties, 1. It is generally recognized, in philosophy, that if we are to have an understanding of the relations, etc., and mind that is either itself scientific, or (perhaps more importantly) meshes seamlessly with science, we have to have accounts of mental phenomena, or concepts that are b) Instead assumed it was structured in such a way as to make these natural used to describe mental phenomena, that show how they can arise from, or how they are environments more easily intelligible? ontologically compatible with, the world as described in the natural sciences. 2. This theoretical project is called **(naturalizing)** such concepts or notions or phenomena. 2. I will argue that doing so means adding a third intellectual challenge to the 3. The most famous example is naturalizing intentionality or naturalizing semantics problem of explaining the mind. a) "Naturalizing intentionality" is a project that any philosopher will recognize 4. The basic question is how semantic relations (the ones we have indicated all semester with blue arrows-like reference to distal objects in the world) can be explained "in scientific terms". (a) One reason this is challenging, as we have seen, is that semantic relations of reference aren't (directly) causal in any evident sense. b) In general, it is not at all clear how meaning something (such as that dinosaurs were warm-blooded), or being true, or referring to the Pharaohs of Egypt, can be accounted for in scientific terms. (IV · Open Issues) Consciousness · 2 Slide 11/38 (IV · Open Issues) Consciousness · 2 Slide 12/38



2. 3.	We don't have time to talk about registration in general today What I want to do is to show how, at the lowest level, it gives us a glimpse of underlie the qualitative character of experience (qualia) So start at the beginning (or at least at what people who think there is a be you can start with!)—i.e., <i>fundamental physics</i>		 Question #1 — What is the world like, according to physican't assume objects? The best way to think of this is field-theoretically It is a world of spectacular and stunning complexity A stupefyingly complex superimposition of interpenetrating vand quiescence and turbulence—vibrations from glacially slocontinuously impinging, forces welling up and falling continue Imagine falling overboard in a storm at sea, surrounded by r stinging spray, and undulating currents, as far as the eye can <i>—and then subtract you!</i> That is approximately what the world is like, according to physical structure in the subtract of the structure is a structure in the subtract is like. 	vaves, vortices and fields w to blazingly fast, forces iously away othing but crashing waves, see
(IV · Open	Issues) Consciousness · 2	Slide 15 / 38	(IV · Open Issues) Consciousness · 2	Slide 16 / 38

















































Slide 11/42

(IV · Open Issues) Ethics of AI



Slide 12/42









- Deontological theories focus on the right action (as opposed to consequences)
- Many deontologists believe that some actions are forbidden no matter how good are the consequences
- Main maxim : people should follow the moral rules and do their duties
- An instance of Deontological theory was proposed by Immanuel Kant (1724-1804)
- Kantian categorical imperative : act only on the maxim through which you consider the maxim to become a universal law

Atoosa Kasirzadeh Ethical considerations of Artificial Intelligence

Too restrictive

• Who should determine what those rules are?

2019 · April · 17	Minds & Machines	Lecture — A · 01	2019 · April · 17	Minds & Machines	Lecture – A · 01
3- Virtue Ethics	S		Virtue ethics' cha	allenges	
Character- virtue throutA quest to	n of virtues through practice - and person-based approach to moral ugh practice understand and live a good life of the I by Confucius, Aristotle, and other and ers	moral character	 It does not be 	vide responses to moral dilemmas enefit the individual ve agree on what are virtues ?	
	Atoosa Kasirzadeh Ethical considerations of Artil			Atoosa Kasirzadeh Ethical considerations of Ar	
(IV · Open Issues) Ethics of A	1	Slide 21/42	(IV · Open Issues) Ethics of AI		Slide 22/42
2019 · April · 17	Minds & Machines	Lecture – A · 01	2019 · April · 17	Minds & Machines	Lecture — A · 01
(a philosop	Trolley Problem phical thought experiment p Philippa Foot (1967))	proposed by	0000		20.000

(IV · Open Issues) Ethics of AI

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2019 · April · 17	Minds & Machines	Lecture — A · 01	2019 · April · 17	Minds & Machines	Lecture — A • 01
The robots as an e	ethical agent				
 Moor's classes 	of ethical agents :				
-	act agents : their actions have ethicantended or not)	al consequences			
	ical agents : ethical considerations b inly safety or security considerations			Robot Ethics	
about differ	ical agents : identify and process mo rent situations and make sensitive no t should be done				
	agents : make moral judgments (an judgments	d state justification			
	Atoosa Kasirzadeh Ethical considerations of Arti	ficial Intelligence		Atoosa Kasirzadeh Ethical considerations of Artificial Intelligence	9
(IV · Open Issues) Ethics of AI		Slide 29 / 42	(IV · Open Issues) Ethics of AI		Slide 30 / 42





Slide 32 / 42

2019 · April · 17	Minds & Machines	Lecture — A · 01	2019 · April · 17	Minds & Machines	Lecture — A · 01
Guidlines for et	hical robots				
A robot human	ot : three laws of robotics by Isac Asin may not injure a human being or through being to come to harm	n inaction, allow a		Machine Ethics	
such or	t must obey orders given by human being rders would conflict with the first law t must protect its own existence as long a				
-	ot conflict with the first or the second law				
	Atoosa Kasirzadeh Ethical considerations of Artifi	cial Intelligence		Atoosa Kasirzadeh Ethical considerations of Artifi	cial Intelligence
(IV · Open Issues) Ethics of AI		Slide 33 / 42	(IV · Open Issues) Ethics o	FAI	Slide 34/42
2019 · April · 17	Minds & Machines	Lecture — A · 01	2019 · April · 17	Minds & Machines	Lecture — A · 01

Learning morality ?

- Learning as improving performance over time
- Learning as a function which predicts output given a set of inputs-outputs
- Kinds of learning : supervised, unsupervised, semi-supervised, reinforcement learning

Atoosa Kasirzadeh Ethical considerations of Artificial Intelligence

Top-down strategies : implement (selected) normative theories of ethics and ensure that the moral agent acts aligned with the principles underlying the theory

Engineering moral machines : top-down vs. bottom-up

• Bottom-up strategies : ethical theories emerge via the activity of individuals rather than in terms of normative theories of ethics

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(IV · Open Issues) Ethics of AI









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Ethical considerations of Artificial Intelligence

Slide 42/42

Lecture $- A \cdot 01$



2019.407 Mind Machines Control of Control of



Singularity \cdot 1 – Characterization (cont'd)

"What are the consequences of this event? When greater-than-normal intelligence drives progress, that progress will be much more rapid. In fact, there seems no reason why progress itself would not involve the creation of *still more intelligent entities*—on a still-shorter time scale.

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The best analogy that I see is with the evolutionary past. Animals can adapt to problems and make inventions, but often no faster than natural selection can do its work—the world acts as its own simulator in the case of natural selection. We humans have the ability to internalize the world and conduct "What if's" in our heads; we can solve many problems **thousands of times faster than natural selection**. Now, by creating the means to execute those simulations at much higher speeds, we are entering a regime as radically different from our human past as we humans are from the lower animals.

From the human point of view, this change will be throwing away of all previous rules, perhaps, in the blink of an eye, an exponential runaway beyond any hope of control."

Verne Vinge, 1993

2019 · April · 17

Lecture – D · 04

























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(IV · Open Issues) Singularity

Slide 17 / 29

Lecture - D · 04

Singularity · 3 - Possibility · Conceptual

1. Unless one is a dualist, it is hard to construct a compelling argument against the possibility of a singularity. 2. There is no physical law, after all, that precluding particles from being organized in ways that perform even more advanced computations than the arrangements of particles in human brains 3. If evolution did it, why can't we?

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(IV · Open Issues) Singularity

2019 · April · 17

Slide 18 / 29

Lecture – D · 04



2019 • Apr	il • 17 Minds & Machines	Lecture — D · 04					
Singul	Singularity \cdot 4 – Merits & Demerits						
1. Me	rits (Pro)						
a)	Eradication of disease?						
b)	Eradication of poverty (through untold advances in efficiency and prod	uction)					
c)	Eradication of war? (some of the triumphalists think so)						
d)	Everything that civilization offers is a product of human intelligence; we what we might achieve when this intelligence is magnified by the tools t provide" (from an "Open Letter on Research Priorities For Robust And Artificial Intelligence, Future of Life Institute)*	hat AI may					
e)	etc. (more good examples are easy to imagine)						
2. De	merits (Con)						
a)	Autonomous-weapon systems that choose and eliminate targets — NB: The UN and Human Rights Watch advocate a treaty banning such weapo	ons					

- b) Transformation of our economy for elite (oligarchical) wealth and terrible dislocation.
- c) Computers that outsmart financial markets, out-invent human researchers, outmanipulate human leaders, and develop weapons we can't understand
- d) Displace, replace, eradicate humans
- a) ... etc. (more terrible examples are easy to imagine)

* http://futureoflife.org/ai-open-letter/

Slide 20 / 29



2019 · April · 17

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Bill Joy (Inventor of Java)

- "The fate of the human race would be at the mercy of the machines"
- "The 21st-century technologies genetics, nanotechnology, and robotics (GNR)—are so powerful that they can spawn whole new classes of accidents and abuses. ...

В

[T]hese accidents and abuses are widely within the reach of individuals or small groups. Knowledge alone will enable the use of them. ... [W]e have the possibility not just of weapons of mass destruction but of knowledge-enabled mass destruction (KMD).

- 3. "I think it is no exaggeration to say we are on the cusp of the further perfection of extreme evil, an evil whose possibility spreads *well beyond that which weapons of mass destruction bequeathed to the nation-states*"
- 4. "[W]ith the prospect of human-level computing power in about 30 years, a new idea suggests itself: that I may be working to create tools which will enable the construction of the technology that may replace our species. How do I feel about this? Very uncomfortable."

5. "We are being propelled into this new century with no plan, no control, no brakes"

Lecture - D · 04

2019 · April · 17

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Elon Musk (Tesla, SpaceX)



"I think we should be very careful about artificial intelligence. If I were to guess like what our biggest existential threat is, it's probably that. So we need to be very careful with the artificial intelligence. Increasingly scientists think there should be some regulatory oversight maybe at the national and international level, just to make sure that we don't do something very foolish. With artificial intelligence we are summoning the demon. In all those stories where there's the guy with the pentagram and the holy water, it's like yeah he's sure he can control the demon. Didn't work out."

Bill Gates

"I am in the camp that is concerned about super intelligence. First the machines will do a lot of jobs for us and not be super intelligent. That should be positive if we manage it well. A few decades after that, though, the intelligence is strong enough to be a concern. I agree with Elon Musk and some others on this and don't understand why some people are not concerned."

(IV · Open Issues) Singularity



Slide 24 / 29

Lecture – D · 04

2019 · April · 17

Minds & Machines

Lecture — D · 04

Steven Hawking

- 1. "I think the development of full artificial intelligence could spell the end of the human race"
- 2. "Once humans develop artificial intelligence, it will take off on its own and redesign itself at an everincreasing rate ... Humans, who are limited by slow biological evolution, couldn't compete and would be superseded."

Steven Wozniak



(IV · Open Issues) Singularity



- "Like people including Stephen Hawking and Elon Musk have predicted, I agree that the future is scary and very bad for people," Wozniak said. "If we build these devices to take care of everything for us, eventually they'll think faster than us and they'll get rid of the slow humans to run companies more efficiently."
- "Computers are going to take over from humans, no question."

Slide 25 / 29

2019 · April · 17

Minds & Machines

Someone else ...

We "suggest is that the human race might easily permit itself to drift into a position of such dependence on the machines that it would have no practical choice but to accept all of the machines' decisions. As society and the problems that face it become more and more complex and machines become more and more intelligent, people will let machines make more of their decisions for them, simply because machine-made decisions will bring better results than man-made ones. Eventually a stage may be reached at which the decisions necessary to keep the system running will be so complex that human beings will be incapable of making them intelligently. At that stage the machines will be in effective control. People won't be able to just turn the machines off, because they will be so dependent on them that turning them off would amount to suicide."



Ted Kaczynski (the Unabomber)

Moral: Human reaction to the singularity (or anything approaching it) may be violent...

(IV · Open Issues) Singularity

Slide 26 / 29





2019 · April · 17	Minds & Machines	Lecture — D · 04
П	hanks for comíng on the tríp!	
(IV · Open Issues) Singularit	у	Slide 29 / 29